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UNEQUAL CHECKS: A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ELITE POLITICAL 
REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
CHRISTOPHER REED ALEXANDER 
ABSTRACT 
The interactions, often clashes, between our branches of government are some of the 
most salient and important features of the U.S democratic system. The Supreme Court, 
given its unique position within this system, finds itself at the center of many of these 
clashes. While considerable literature in American political science dedicates itself to the 
study of the interactions between the Supreme Court and other political elites, we remain 
without a complete understanding of how political elites interact with the Court. 
Specifically, we fall short in our understanding of how political elites, both liberal and 
conservative, react following Supreme Court decisions governing their policy interests. 
This study intends to bridge this gap in knowledge. By studying the reactions of political 
elites following 8 specifically chosen Supreme Court decisions, via an extensive content 
search using an expansive newspaper database, this paper identifies an asymmetry in the 
actions taken by liberal and conservative political elites. 
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Introduction 
““John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” 
Andrew Jackson,  
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
The Supreme Court, given its unique positioning following the decision in 
Marbury v. Madison, often entangles itself in our country’s most controversial political 
issues. In these situations, the Court acts as final arbiter; it overrides the prerogatives of 
the legislature and executive, and strikes down the interests of Democrats and 
Republicans alike. The interactions between the judiciary and other political actors 
remain amongst the most salient in our politics. 
 In its role as final arbiter, the Court often determines political winners and losers. 
When the Court decides to either uphold or strike down a law, some political interest 
benefits and some political interest suffers. The policy battle does not end following the 
Court’s decision, though. Political actors, ranging from Presidents to state representatives 
to city mayors, often engage in political responses following Supreme Court decisions.  
 Much of what we understand about this political aftermath — meaning the 
political actions taken after the Court makes a decision — comes from Michael 
Klarman’s conception of the “backlash thesis”. Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis 
allowed us a new lens through which to view Supreme Court decisions. As Klarman 
notes, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board, conservative political 
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figures, at the state and federal level, reacted strongly and swiftly in an effort to mitigate 
their losses.1  
 While Klarman’s thesis considers the efficacy of their strong reaction, he 
implicitly introduces a new way of studying Supreme Court decisions. Supreme Court 
decisions exist in a very active political environment; their introduction to that 
environment transforms the political and policy landscape. The announcement of 
decisions allows for political elite action in response.  
 The literature following Klarman’s thesis continued expanding on the efficacy of 
responsive political strategies to Court decisions.  LA Ball explicitly uses Klarman’s 
framework to analyze the reaction of conservative political elites following the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.2 
Here again, Ball’s analysis considers how the reactions of conservative politicians 
changed the political landscape surrounding the issue of same-sex marriage. At the same 
time, it provides an insightful summary of the strategies employed by conservatives 
reacting to an unfavorable Court decision. This literature provides a number of valuable 
insights into the interactions between our branches of governments. 
 However, this literature does not fully explain how political actors respond to 
Supreme Court decisions. While these studies rather explicitly consider the efficacy of 
the strategies employed by politicians following two specific unfavorable Court 
                                                 
1 Klarman, Michael J. "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis." The Journal of 
American History (Oxford University Press) 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 81-118. 
2 Ball, Carlos A. "The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown V. Board of 
Education and its Aftermath." William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (College of William and Mary) 14 
(May 2006). 
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decisions, we do not yet fully understand how politicians react to Supreme Court 
decisions that often change the policy landscapes they are supposed to control.  
 This paper seeks to provide a narrower and more focused summary of that 
consideration, looking more broadly at how political elites interact with the judiciary via 
responses to Supreme Court decisions. I will not debate the efficacy or success of these 
reactions. Rather, I will, more simply, summarize when political elites respond to 
decisions and what their responses consist of. 
 I intend to broaden our understanding of this consideration by answering the 
questions that remain unanswered by the current literature. In the first place, the literature 
currently focuses almost entirely on how conservatives respond to unfavorable Court 
decisions. The two aforementioned studies - and further studies inspired by the backlash 
thesis - identify backlash as a conservative response to liberal advances made in court.3 
By focusing so heavily on conservative political elite reaction, we ignore how the other 
half of our political elites react to Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, there are instances 
where conservative interests win over liberal interest in the Court’s decisions. Thus, this 
paper seeks to answer two questions aimed at addressing this shortcoming:  
1. Do liberal political elites react, meaning fight back against, Supreme Court 
decisions that harm liberal interests? 
2. If so, is their response proportional in magnitude to the reactions of conservative 
political elites when the Court rules against conservative interests? 
                                                 
3 Klarman, Michael J. "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis." The Journal of 
American History (Oxford University Press) 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 81-118. and Ibid 
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In the second place, the literature focuses entirely on how political elites react 
upon losses in the Supreme Court. Here again, this ignores the other half of potential 
responses; in every case, one side wins. It is equally important to understand how 
political elites react when they win, if we are to hold a holistic understanding of how this 
interaction plays out. Thus, this paper also seeks to answer two questions aimed at 
addressing this second shortcoming: 
1. How do political elites respond when they win in the Court? 
2. Are liberal and conservative reactions to victories in the Court proportional? 
 In sum, this paper offers a more broad conception of backlash, analyzing more 
generally the reactions of political elites to Supreme Court decisions, both in favor and 
opposition of their policy interests. My analysis intends to offer preliminary evidence 
suggesting that an asymmetry exists between how liberal and conservative political elites 
react to Supreme Court decisions. In order to make that determination, I ask two critical 
questions: are the same strategies employed by both sets of political elites and do they 
react at similar times. 
 In order to measure elite political response, I conduct an extensive content search 
of over 15,000 news publications, studying the actions of political elites following 8 
Supreme Court cases, deciding issues relevant to both conservative and liberal policy 
interests. From there, I examine the actions of political elites, looking specifically for the 
typically utilized strategies, as outlined by the existing literature. 
 The forthcoming analysis allows us a deeper understanding of elite behavior, 
giving us a stronger sense of how our branches of government interact, and critically, 
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how partisanship can affect those interactions. Moreover, this analysis holds sizable 
accountability considerations. If there exists such an asymmetry in the actions of 
representatives when confronted with an obstacle, how does the electorate respond?  
Defining Reaction 
 If this paper seeks to identify asymmetries in elite reaction, it is critical to first 
establish the complete range of political actions which could be used towards that end. In 
other words, what are all the plausible reactions to Supreme Court decisions employed by 
political elites in the past? Klarman and Ball, although not intentionally, provide an 
excellent summary of the types of reactions one would expect. This section outlines 
research listing the reactions of political elites to Court decisions. 
 This literature establishes a handful of commonly used strategies in reaction to 
Court decisions. These include constitutional amendment proposals, bills within the 
legislature, speeches, press appearances, and general statements of position. I use the 
foundation this literature provides as a guide for my analysis. When considering the 
reaction of political elites within my analysis, I look specifically for the presence of these 
strategies. 
 Perhaps the most forceful reaction employed by elites is the introduction of 
constitutional amendments, at the state or federal level. Following the Brown decision, 
four separate state legislatures introduced constitutional amendments aimed at undoing 
the effects of the Court’s decision on their own school districts.4 In the aftermath of 
                                                 
4 Klarman, Michael J. "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis." The Journal of 
American History (Oxford University Press) 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 81-118. 
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Goodridge, Senators introduced a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage within 5 days of the announcement, and 11 states approved constitutional 
amendments relating to same-sex marriage, with a majority calling for its prohibition.5 
These constitutional amendments varied in the way in which they sought to undermine 
the Court’s decision. That being said, for our purposes, the important takeaway is that the 
introduction of constitutional amendments directly related to the Court’s decision is one 
way in which elites react. 
 Constitutional amendments are not the only legislative mechanism by which elites 
react. Following Goodridge, the Ohio legislature enacted a statute outlawing the 
acknowledgement of same-sex marriage and domestic partnership benefits.6 Here again, 
the mechanism by which each of the pieces of legislation intended to undermine the 
Court’s decision differs widely. Ultimately, though, the introduction of legislation, rather 
than Constitutional amendments, remains a possible reaction by political elites. 
 While these strategies constitute formal mechanisms of reaction, elites can also 
react in less formal ways. These actions can be described as statements of condemnation 
or support for the Court’s decision. For example, in his first State of the Union address 
following the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, President Obama opined that 
the Court “reversed a century of law that [he] believe[s] will open the floodgates for 
                                                 
5 Ball, Carlos A. "The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown V. Board of 





special interests”.7 On the day the Massachusetts court released their decision in 
Goodridge, in a media appearance, President Bush explained his intention to work with 
Congress in defending the sanctity of marriage.8 After the court’s decision in Brown, 100 
southern congressmen signed the “Southern Manifesto”, calling on “all lawful means to 
bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution”.9 Here again, 
these statements vary in tone and forum, but speech is often used as a tool in reaction to 
the Court’s decision. 
 While these strategies make up the large part of the previous literature’s focus, 
there is another element of elite reaction that is important to understand. Critical to both 
Klarman’s and Ball’s discussion of backlash is the idea that the Court’s decision 
“radicalized” the politics surrounding the policy issue. By “radicalized”, the authors refer 
to the response by those elites as being so resolute in opposition to the decision, that they 
“reject out of hand any effort to compromise”.10 Which is to say, the aforementioned 
strategies compose the elite reaction, and are inspired by the “radicalization” of the issue. 
The opposition does not move to compromise. In the wake of unfavorable court 
decisions, the opposition does not look for middle ground. The “radical” element of their 
                                                 
7 Silverleib, Alan. “Gloves Come off after Obama Rips Supreme Court Ruling.” CNN. Cable News 
Network, January 28, 2010. https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/28/alito.obama.sotu/index.html. 
8 Ball, Carlos A. "The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown V. Board of 
Education and its Aftermath." William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (College of William and Mary) 14 
(May 2006). 
9 Klarman, Michael J. "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis." The Journal of 
American History (Oxford University Press) 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 81-118. 
10 Ball, Carlos A. "The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown V. Board of 
Education and its Aftermath." William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (College of William and Mary) 14 
(May 2006). 
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response shines through the statements they make following the decisions and the 
legislative strategies they pursue. 
When to Expect Reaction 
With an understanding of what actions constitute reaction, the natural next step 
is defining those conditions that make a reaction likely. One might assume that a reaction 
should follow every court decision. The literature surrounding the backlash thesis 
indicates otherwise. Here, I outline those conditions which make reaction on the part of 
political elites likely to occur. 
First, the Court’s decision must concern a “highly charged political issue”.11 
This is the most important condition for analysis. The charged nature of the issue is what 
provides incentive for political elites to react, be it because they care about the issue 
themselves or their constituents care. “Reaction” requires usage of political capital. 
Absent an issue that is highly charged political elites will not have incentive to act. As 
such, my analysis only considers those decisions congruent with these two conditions.  
Method 
My analysis is designed specifically to determine whether Republican and 
Democratic elites use the same strategies in reacting to Supreme Court decisions and if 
they react at similar times. I will outline that process in turn. 
To begin, I utilize a scale measuring the strategies employed by political elites 
reacting to Court decisions. This scale follows from passive reactions to stronger 
                                                 
11 Klarman, Michael J. Courts, Social Change, and Political Backlash. Speaker Notes, Georgetown Law 
Library, Georgetown University Law Center, Georgetown Law Library, 2011, 12. 
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reactions, and is built on the simple intuition that more passive strategies require less 
effort, while stronger strategies require more effort. The scale includes five strategies: 
constitutional amendments, legislative proposals, speeches, media appearances, and press 
memos. I consider constitutional amendments and legislative proposals stronger 
reactions, requiring more effort, while speeches, media appearances, and press memos 
are more passive reactions, requiring less effort.  
From here, I analyze the reactions of conservative and liberal political elites 
following decisions where their policies were either upheld or struck. In this way, I assure 
that the immediate political interests of those political elites whose reaction I am 
concerned with are implicated. Furthermore, I consider only those decisions that also 
meet the criteria of a decision likely to produce a reaction.  
In all, I analyze 8 decisions total. Four of those cases involve the Court 
deciding the validity of a liberal policy interests, and four involve the Court deciding the 
validity of conservative policy interests. Within each group of 4, I analyze 2 cases where 
the side’s interest is upheld and 2 cases where the side’s interest is struck down by the 
Court. Table 1 indicates the breakdown more clearly. 
 
This breakdown allows a holistic view of how political elites react to Supreme 
Court decisions in general. It allows analysis of how elites react when their own interests 
 Upheld Struck Down 
Liberal Policy 2 cases 2 cases 
Conservative Policy 2 cases 2 cases 
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either directly win or lose, and how they react when their opponent’s interest either wins 
or loses. Moreover, where previous literature analyzes reactions on a case by case basis, 
this breakdown provides a sample size of at least 2 for each category, allowing for the 
emergence of preliminary pattern recognition. 
 While this study provides a wider view of elite political reactions to Supreme 
Court decisions, it is important to discuss the limitations of this breakdown. In looking to 
provide analysis of reactions from a wide-range of political circumstances, each 
categories sample case size remains at 2 cases. As such, the findings contributed by the 
analysis of those two cases, in conjunction with the previous literature, should be taken as 
preliminary evidence upon which further studies should be motivated and informed. 
The next step in this analysis follows the actual events after a decision’s 
announcements. Keeping in mind the specific reactions I anticipate, I conduct a content 
search within a newspaper database of over 15,000 publications across the country and 
globe, spanning editions published in every year of the 20th and 21st century. I 
supplement the content search on this database, with an additional online news 
publication search that includes articles published by CNN, Politico, NPR, and the New 
York Times, among other sources.  
The articles produced by these news publications provide me with a sense of 
the actions undertaken in the three months following the decision. As such, I go to 
extensive measures to ensure that all articles relevant to a decision and reaction are 
included. To search for these reactions, I search for any articles that include the case 
caption, both party names, and a number of terms associated with the policy issue. This 
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often produces hundreds of search results, and a number of unrelated articles, but it also 
guarantees that if action were taken by political elites, and covered by any of the sources 
included in the database or supplemental sources, I will find it. 
While this process goes to extensive lengths to ensure that as much content is 
captured as possible, it is not infallible. Where larger legislative actions - like legislative 
proposals and constitutional amendments - will almost surely be captured, statements 
made by individual legislators may slip through the cracks. Given the size of the search 
pool, I do not anticipate this happening often, but it remains a possibility. Nonetheless, 
any missed actions undertaken by a legislator would be random, would likely impact each 
party symmetrically, and would not comprise this paper's findings.  
Within this step, I carefully restrict the range of time after the announcement 
for which an action can be attributed as reaction to the decision. The previously 
mentioned studies employ very generous time constraints; Klarman references statements 
made by politicians in the months leading up to and the year following the decision, 
while Ball considers actions similarly taken in the months leading up to and a year 
following the decision.  
Where previous studies employed a larger time frame, I prefer usage of a 
shorter one, ensuring the action can actually be attributed to the decision. This frame 
must be short enough so as to constrict action immediately inspired by the decision, while 
long enough to allow for institutional constraints. For my content search, I look only for 
actions and statements made by political elites within 3 months of the decision’s 
announcements, a value purposely more restrictive than previous analyses, but not so 
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much so that valuable content is excluded. For the purpose of the content search, I restrict 
the search only to articles published within the three-month period, or articles citing 
information from within that timeframe.  
The Case List 
With the general design outlined, I move now towards listing the cases at the 
center of this study. In all, I analyze 8 cases, 2 from each aforementioned category. As 
discussed previously, the subject of these cases must be substantively politically charged, 
providing the motivation for politicians to respond. As such, the case list for this analysis 
focuses solely on those decisions satisfying this condition.  
In order to guarantee the satisfaction of this condition, I restrict my case 
selection only to those decisions discussed in the textbook, American Constitutionalism, 
by Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington. The textbook provides a 
survey of decisions concerning the most important political debates throughout American 
history. The textbook is widely used in university classes throughout the country focusing 
on important supreme court decisions. My justification for this decision is a simple one. 
This textbook discusses only those cases which the authors - legal scholars - deem 
important and relevant to the most outstanding political debates within American history. 
I use the inclusion of a case within these authors ’textbook as an endorsement that the 
issue discussed is sufficiently politically charged. 
This choice brings with it benefits for the purpose of my analysis, but also 
some restrictions. As mentioned previously, this guarantees that the cases I analyze are 
sufficiently politically charged. As such, I am analyzing only those cases where a 
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reaction is most likely to occur. This decision isolates the “political chargedness” of each 
policy issue analyzed, eliminating a potential confounding variable. At the same time, 
this decision limits my capability to test the conditions likely to produce a reaction, as I 
only consider cases that meet them. Nonetheless, this choice allows me to compare elite 
reaction in relatively similar political circumstances, such that a lack of political attention 
cannot explain a potential lack of reaction. 
With this in mind, I study the following cases: For liberal policies struck down, 
I study District of Columbia v. Heller - case where the Court struck down a local 
handgun restriction and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby - a case where the Court struck down 
federal law requiring companies to include contraceptives in their employee health 
insurance plan, in favor of allowing religious exceptions, protecting the free exercise of 
religion; for liberal policies upheld, Grutter v. Bollinger - a case where the Court upheld 
a law school's affirmative action admissions process and Hill v. Colorado - a case where 
the Court upheld a local ordinance prohibiting political demonstrations immediately 
outside of abortion clinics; for conservative policies struck down, Lawrence v. Texas - a 
case striking down a state law prohibiting private homosexual activity and Roe v. Wade - 
a case where the court struck down a state law prohibiting abortion; for conservative 
policies upheld, Town of Greece v. Galloway - a case where the Court upheld a town’s 
practice of beginning legislative sessions with a denominational prayer and Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris - a case upholding a local policy allowing for city provided educational 
voucher use at private, denominations schools.  
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This list of cases covers policy issues including: gun rights, freedom of 
religion, homosexuality, abortion, and freedom of speech. This choice is a deliberate one. 
Firstly, the previous literature focuses on reactions to decisions concerning social issues. 
While it may be the case that political elite reaction changes depending on the policy 
arena, for the purpose of determining whether a general asymmetry exists, this issue does 
not yet need to be addressed. Furthermore, and similarly, maintaining focus on decisions 
concerning social issues eliminates the risk of inviting a confounding variable. Secondly, 
there remains the concern of choosing policy issues “politically charged” enough to 
satisfy the condition for appropriate cases to study. Insofar as that is true, each issue 
mentioned was at the time of the decision sufficiently politically charged, and in some 
instances, although years have passed since that decision, remain sufficiently politically 
charged. Moreover, all of these cases are covered in the American Constitutionalism 
textbook, establishing each case as covering a politically charged issue.  
This design provides a more holistic and comprehensive view of elite political 
reaction following Supreme Court decisions. Where other literature focused on a single 
case, casting a very wide net in terms of the timeframe attributed to the decision, this 
design presents itself as a systematic and sensitive analysis of political elite reactions in a 
number of different circumstances. With this design, we gain intuition concerning the 
critical nuance of how elites react when their interests explicitly lose (struck down 
category) versus their reaction when the opposition interest wins (opp. upheld category), 
as well as introducing the idea that political elites attempt to capitalize on victories within 
the Court.  
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Data 
 In the following sections, I summarize the political elite reactions following the 
above-mentioned Supreme Court decision. In each section, I provide a brief summary of 
the Court’s decision, providing context for the reactions of political elites, establish each 
issue as a policy interest held by either conservatives or liberals, outline the actions taken 
by political elites in the three months following the decision, and then analyze any 
reaction produced.  
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)  
 In 2008, the Court interpreted the intention of the 2nd amendment for only the 
second time in the Court’s history, and the first time in almost 70 years. The focus of 
Heller was a District of Columbia firearms restriction. In 1976, Washington D.C passed a 
city ordinance which banned the possession of handguns, and banned anyone from 
carrying a handgun without permission.12 The law also required that other firearms which 
were allowed to be owned within the district, such as rifles and shotguns, be kept 
unloaded, and either disassembled or trigger-locked.13 
 Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-justice majority, found the law to be 
unconstitutional. Prior to Heller, the precedent established by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Miller, and the precedent relied upon by lower courts for the following 
70 years, found that the second amendment “the Second Amendment guarantees no right 
                                                 




to keep and bear a firearm that does not have “some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia””.14 Scalia’s decision in Heller held 
that the second amendment guaranteed an individual the right to bear arms, irrespective 
of the state’s ability to establish a militia.15 
 Before proceeding, I dedicate a brief discussion establishing that the law struck 
down in Heller represents an interest of liberal political elites. 
Heller as a Liberal Policy Interest 
 In order for Heller to be analyzed within the framework discussed above, it must 
be the case that the Court struck down a law consistent with liberal policy interests. As 
outlined previously, a 1976 local ordinance stood as the central issue in Heller. Walter 
Washington - a Democrat - served as the mayor of D.C in 1976.16 Democrats have served 
as mayor in every year since 1976.17 Which is to say, Democrats in the city oversaw the 
enforcement of the law passed under a Democrat mayor.  
 What’s more, the regulation passed in 1976 is congruent with the interests of the 
Democratic Party nationally. Democratic mayors across the country passed similar laws, 
and Democrats operating at the federal level espoused similar ideas. In this instance, we 
can readily identify the law struck down in Heller as one supported by liberals, matching 
the framework of this analysis. 
The Heller Reaction 
                                                 
14 Lewis v. United States. 445 U.S. 55 (The Supreme Court, February 27, 1980). 
15 District of Columbia v. Heller. 544 US 570 (The Supreme Court, June 26, 2008). 
16 “Mayors of the District of Columbia Since Home Rule.” Mayors of the District of Columbia Since Home 




 The response of liberal political elites varied greatly. A number of liberal political 
elites voiced great concern with the Court’s decision. Rep. Diane Feinstein explained her 
fear that, “the people of this great country will be less safe because of [the decision],”.18 
Senator Frank Lautenberg admonished the Court’s decision, saying that the justices, “put 
rigid ideology ahead of the safety of communities in New Jersey and across the 
country,”.19 Similarly, Mayor of Chicago Richard Daley called the decision “frightening”, 
and voiced concern that all local regulation of gun ownership would be vulnerable to 
legal challenges.20  
 At the same time, some prominent Democratic figures voiced agreement or even 
praised the Court’s ruling in Heller. Presidential Candidate Barack Obama released a 
statement, wherein he expressed agreement with the Court’s interpretation of the second 
amendment, and argued that the Court endorsed the need for communities to save 
vulnerable populations from gun violence.21 Rep. Gabrielle Giffords called the ruling 
“common sense”, and Ohio Governor Ted Strickland explained that he “concurred '' with” 
the “landmark decision”.2223 Perhaps the strongest praise for the decision came from 
Senator Patrick Leachy, who explained his thinking that the opinion should “usher in a 
new era in which the constitutionality of government regulations of firearms are reviewed 
against the backdrop of this important right,”.24  
                                                 
18 (qtd. in Kilgore News Herald, 2008) 
19 (qtd. in Huffington Post 2008) 
20 (qtd. in Daily Press Newport, 2008) 
21 (IBID) 
22 (qtd. in Arizona Daily Star, 2008) 
23 (qtd. in National Post, 2008) 
24 (qtd. in The Independent Record, 2008) 
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 While the initial statements of liberal political elites revealed a mixed bag of 
reactions to the Court’s decision, their actions in the time after reveal further restraint. I 
consider actions taken at three levels: city, state, and federal. 
 At the city-level, only one new piece of legislation was introduced dealing with 
gun regulations. Of course, it was Washington D.C. who revamped their regulations 
following the Court’s decision.25 This new regulation did not attempt to contradict the 
Court’s decision, and instead sought to act within the bounds it established. No other 
municipality introduced new regulations concerning restrictions on gun ownership or 
sales.  
 In the three months following the decision, two state legislatures introduced laws 
seeking to restrict gun sales in some manner. The North Carolina general assembly 
introduced a law to Bar gun sales to some individuals who have been involuntarily 
committed to mental health hospitals.26 The New Jersey state assembly twice introduced 
legislation that would limit people to buying one handgun per month.27 However, the 
New Jersey assembly’s action can be attributed to a rise in shootings in the Camden area, 
and not a response to the Court’s decision. Similarly, no state legislatures introduced calls 
for state constitutional amendments redefining individual gun rights. 
 At the federal level, no legislation was introduced concerning restrictions on gun 
ownership or sales within the three-month period following the decision. Even if my 
strict time period were expanded to allow for consideration of the 111th Congress (2009-
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2011), operating under a Democratic majority), Democrats did not introduce any 
legislation seeking to contradict the court’s ruling, or even any legislation relevant to the 
restriction of gun ownership or sales. 
Analyzing the Heller Reaction 
 Taken altogether, the response from political elite Democrats was uneven. On the 
one hand, there were strong statements of condemnation from well-respected, long-
serving public figures. The statements of Rep. Feinstein highlight the strong opposition 
held by some Democrats. These statements, and the emotions behind them, were not 
widely held within the Democratic Party, as other prominent figures voiced support and 
agreement with the decision. In fact, the Party’s preeminent nominee for the Presidency 
voiced his support. 
 The differences in statements regarding the decision underscore the larger theme 
revealed from the Heller analysis. Democrats splintered following the Heller decision. 
From the day after the decision’s announcements, the lack of unity in opinion regarding 
the decision’s merits was wholly apparent, as one prominent figure contradicted another.  
 With this understanding of how the Democratic Party’s elites responded initially, 
it is unsurprising to see a lack of effort towards substantial legislation. Democrats 
nationwide managed 2 pieces of legislation relevant to restricting gun ownership: one 
attributable to circumstances removed from the decision, and neither comparable to a 
constitutional amendment. Further, the lack of federal action comes in spite of Democrats 
holding the majority in both houses of Congress at the time of the decision.28 
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 All in all, Democrats reacted to Heller disjointed and lacking punch. Following 
Heller, Democrats responded by both supporting and opposing the decision, while no 
relevant legislation was introduced. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014) 
 President Barack Obama campaigned heavily on the issue of health-care. In 2010, 
President Obama signed into law the Affordable Care Act. Part of the Affordable Care 
Act required employers to provide their employees with certain types of preventative 
care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods.29 The Obama-administration 
allowed non-profit religious organizations the ability to remain exempt from the mandate. 
The owners of a 500-store national chain -- a for-profit organization -- objected to their 
forced purchase of contraception, citing their Christian faith. What’s more, the owners of 
the store argued that their beliefs were protected under the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act (RFRA).30  
 Writing for the 5-justice majority, Justice Alito concluded that the RFRA 
extended onto corporations, since corporations are composed of individuals. As such, the 
contraception mandate substantially burdened the owners sincerely held religious beliefs 
and was unlawful.31 Moreover, in a concurring opinion, the Court detailed the Obama-
administration’s failure to explain any meaningful difference between nonprofit and for-
profit organizations, which would justify the law's differential treatment.32  
                                                 





 In the following section, I detail the liberal response to the Court’s ruling in 
Burwell. Before proceeding with that discussion, I first, briefly, establish the 
contraception mandate as a law held by liberal interests.  
Burwell as a Liberal Policy Interest 
  This section intends to briefly establish the contraception mandate - and the 
greater Affordable Care Act - as a liberal policy interest. As discussed previously, 
President Obama’s campaign for the presidency relied heavily on healthcare issues. The 
Affordable Care Act was colloquially termed Obamacare because of his support. In 2010, 
a Democratic Congress signed into law the Affordable Care Act, and President Obama 
signed it into law.33 With that, we can reasonably be sure that the Affordable Care Act 
represents a liberal policy interest. 
The Burwell Reaction 
 Liberal response to the ruling began strong and unified in opposition. The day the 
Court announced its ruling, President Obama claimed that the “decision creates health 
risks for women”, and that the decision “jeopardizes the health of the women who are 
employed by these companies”.34 He further called on Congress to ensure women get the 
coverage they need.  
 Congressional Democrats produced similar statements condemning the Court. 
Democrat Senate Majority-Whip Dick Durbin claimed that the decision, “threaten[ed] 
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one of the most fundamental health rights in our country”.35 Democrat Senator Kay 
Hagan called the debate over women’s health coverage “shameful”.36 Democrat Senator 
Claire McCaskill took a less harsh tone, explaining that contraception coverage would 
limit abortions, which is a goal worthy of being pursued in balance with the protection of 
religious freedom.37  
 Liberal response did not end with statements condemning the Court’s decision. 
Congressional Democrats offered a number of potential legislative responses. In July, 
less than two weeks after the decision, Congressional Democrats announced their 
intention to introduce a constitutional amendment overturning the Citizens United 
decision, as an indirect manner of responding to the Court’s decision.38 On July 11th, 
Democrat Senator Harry Reid announced that the Senate would hold hearings to discuss 
the matter.39 Days later, Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal held a Senate hearing 
regarding abortion.40 Specifically, Senator Blumenthal argued that state legislatures have 
no right to limit the procedure and introduced legislation precluding state legislatures 
from blocking abortion access.  
 Congressional Democratic action did not end with these indirect responses to the 
Court’s decision. Democrat Senator Patty Murray led the Democratic response to the 
Court’s decision, saying “Since the Supreme Court decided it will not protect women’s 
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access to health care, I will”.41 In mid-July, Senator Durbin announced his intention to 
introduce legislation requiring corporations that are newly exempted from the 
contraception mandate to disclose their coverage policy to employees and job 
applicants.42 Following these announcements, Congressional Democrats introduced 
legislation requiring all employers to provide any type of coverage specified by federal 
law. The bill had 45 Democrat co-sponsors and was supported by the Obama 
administration.43  
 While July featured numerous attempts from Democrats to respond, in August the 
reactions slowed down significantly. In late August, the Obama administration introduced 
their response to the religious objections raised in the Court’s decisions.44 The Obama 
administration’s plan provided non-profit, religious organizations the same ability to 
remain exempt from the contraception mandate. Consistent with the arguments posed by 
the Court in their concurring opinion, the Obama administration extended exemption 
ability onto for-profit companies as well. Instead, the Department of Health and Human 
Services would coordinate with those companies ’insurance providers so that the federal 
government would pay for the contraception coverage of employees, rather than the 
employer.  
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Analyzing the Burwell Reaction 
 Liberal reaction immediately following the Court’s decision was strong and 
unified. Prominent Democrats, ranging from the President, to the Senate Majority whip, 
issued statements condemning the Court’s ruling. These statements issued clear 
disagreement with the decision and the intention for legislative action. 
 Where those statements promised a legislative response, Congressional 
Democrats delivered. The actual legislation offered by Democrats was more unfocused 
than their statements of condemnation. Democrats offered a constitutional amendment 
undoing a Supreme Court decision issued 4 years prior, recognizing the concept of 
corporate personhood, but not directly approaching the logic used by the Court in the 
Burwell case.  Similarly, the Senate saw legislative proposals protecting abortion rights 
from state law, an issue related to women’s health care, but not directly related to the 
contraception mandate and employers. That being said, Democrats produced one bill 
directly addressing employer’s ability to opt-out of coverage, and the Senate majority 
whip threatened a second bill forcing employers to publicly disclose their healthcare 
policy.  
 These legislative attempts represent strong -- albeit wide-ranging -- attempts to 
respond to the Court’s decision. In this instance, Democrats openly criticized the Court, 
and offered legislation opposing the Court’s will. However, these attempts lasted only 
throughout the month of July. By August, Democrats embraced the court’s ruling. Rather 
than continuing their opposition, the Obama administration’s new plan operated under the 
guidance of the Court’s ruling, allowing for profit-corporation exceptions. Consistent 
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with the court’s concurring opinion, arguing that for-profit and nonprofit organizations 
have no meaningful difference, the Obama administration resolved by treating them the 
same. In this way, Democrats conceded to the Court’s ruling, and measures opposing the 
Court, at least within the three-month timeframe, were suspended.  
Roe v. Wade (1973) 
 In 1970, Texas law prohibited abortion, except in those circumstances where it 
was required to save the pregnant mother’s life.45 The Texas statute bore similarity to a 
number of statutes in states across the country. In 1971, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Roe v. Wade. The Court questioned whether or not the constitution granted 
any personal right to an abortion.  
 Justice Blackmun, writing for the 7-justice majority, found that the Constitution’s 
umbrella of personal privacy includes a woman’s right to an abortion.46 More 
specifically, the Court found that the state may not regulate a woman's choice within the 
first trimester of her pregnancy. In the second trimester, the state may only impose 
regulations as they are related to maternal health. In the third trimester, at this later stage 
in fetal development, the state may regulate abortions or prohibit them entirely, so long as 
the laws contain exceptions for cases when abortion is necessary to save the life or health 
of the mother.47 
 Roe v. Wade remains one of the most highly contested and debated Supreme 
Court decisions, receiving high praise from supporters, but strong criticism from 
                                                 




conservatives and liberals alike. In the forthcoming sections, I analyze this famous 
decision within the framework of this study. As such, I begin by establishing that the 
regulation of abortion was a conservative policy interest. Afterward, I outline the 
response and actions of conservative legislators in the three month’s following the Court’s 
announcement.  
Roe as a Conservative Policy Interest 
 In 1970, the landscape of the abortion debate looked very different than it does 
now. Opponents of abortion could be found equally on either side of the political aisle. 
With that being said, the ability to regulate and prohibit abortions remained a strong 
conservative interest. By 1976, the Republican Party platform included a section 
explaining the party’s support for a “constitutional amendment to restore protection of the 
right to life for unborn children”.48  
 The framework does not require exclusivity of political interests. While it may be 
the case that some Democrats, at the time, aligned themselves with conservatives on the 
issue of abortion, that does not change the fact that conservatives strongly held their 
interest in regulating abortion. As such, the issue of abortion is sufficiently held by 
conservatives for the forthcoming analysis.  
The Roe Reaction 
 On January 22nd, the Court announced their decision to strike down the Texas 
law prohibiting abortion. As discussed previously, a number of states held similar laws in 
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their own legislatures. Within the week, Republican state legislators across the country 
began mounting their response. In fact, the Iowa state legislature announced their initial 
response to the Court the same day as the decision. Republican Iowa state Rep. Phillip 
Hill R explained, “one of the concerns I've had all along is that if the Supreme Court 
moves to throw out a law similar to Iowa's and we have a situation where no law 
exists”49. Two Republican state senators voiced similar concern, favoring passage of new 
legislation as quickly as possible.50 As of January 22, a Republican state senator 
sponsored a new law regulating abortion.51 
 Within 8 days of the decision, federal representatives followed suit. On January 
30, Republican Lawrence Hogan introduced a constitutional amendment aiming to 
counteract the Court’s decision.52 Representative Hogan’s amendment called for the 
banning of abortion nationwide, and defined, “life as beginning at the moment of 
conception”. He went on to call the Supreme Court “morally bankrupt” for their actions.53  
 Over the course of the next month, state legislators continued to act. Several state 
legislatures explicitly called on Congress to take further action. In Ohio, Republican state 
Rep. John A. Bechtold sponsored a resolution calling on Congress to pursue a 
constitutional amendment concerning abortion.54 Specifically, the Ohio legislature asked 
Congress for an amendment allowing each state to individually determine the legality of 
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abortions. The South Dakota legislature passed a similar resolution, asking Congress to 
take stronger steps. Rep. Joe Barnett, the leading House Republican, sponsored a 
resolution asking Congress to propose an Amendment to the US Constitution recognizing 
an unborn child's right to life.55 
 While state legislatures called on Congress to act, Congress followed suit. On 
February 21st, a second Republican congressman introduced the idea of a constitutional 
amendment. Rep. John N. Erlenborn expressed his distress over the Court’s “willingness 
to give the convenience of the pregnant woman more weight than the morality of taking a 
life,”.56 Explaining that his actions came as a result of the court’s decision in Roe, Rep. 
Erlenborn introduced a constitutional amendment to block abortion on demand, 
guaranteeing due process and equal protection of the law from the time of conception. 
 As the year continued into March, Republican attempts to change federal and 
state law only continued. In New Mexico, a Republican state legislator, Robert Jordan, 
proposed a state constitutional amendment assigning “the unborn the same constitutional 
rights that those who are born have”.57 Earlier in the month, Republican state-Rep. James 
Caldwell sponsored a new law regulating abortion, deemed by the state’s AG as overly 
restrictive and likely to face a challenge in court.58 A few days after the New Mexico 
state legislature’s actions, the Minnesota and Indiana state legislatures both passed 
resolutions calling for Congressional action. Conservative Minn. Rep. Tad Jude 
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sponsored the Minnesota resolution, saying that the Court’s decision “was a step 
backward… life is no longer sacred”.59 Indiana Republican state-senator Gary Byker 
sponsored Indiana’s resolution, explaining that “if Congress and the states are as 
concerned about the rights of the unborn child as they were about giving 18 year olds the 
right to vote, who in many instances have been very irresponsible, perhaps we will be 
successful”.60  
 Following this pattern, by March Congressional Republicans introduced a third 
constitutional amendment. In this instance, 12 Congressional Republicans introduced a 
proposed constitutional amendment giving states the unqualified right to make their own 
abortion laws.61 Republican Rep. William Whitehurst authored the proposed 
constitutional amendment, again citing the court’s decision in Roe as motivation.  
 In the weeks after, Republican state legislators sought the ability to regulate 
abortion, beyond the timeframe allowed by the Court’s trimester framework. Where the 
Court explained that the state’s ability to regulate abortion stood mostly in the third 
trimester, Indiana Republican state-Rep. Jerome J. Reppa attempted to pass a law 
furthering the state’s restrictions on abortion in the second trimester.62  
Analyzing the Roe Reaction 
 The summary of conservative reactions following the Court’s decision in Roe 
easily shows a strong, swift, and coordinated effort to mitigate the policy losses brought 
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upon by the Court. More than just mitigate losses, the efforts by conservative legislatures 
sought to undo -- entirely -- the Court’s decision.  
 Republicans at the state and federal level produced countless calls for -- if not 
explicit proposals of -- constitutional amendments undoing the Court’s decision. These 
constitutional amendments either stripped the federal government of the ability to dictate 
abortion law or called on the federal government to outright ban abortion, defining life as 
conservatives saw fit. In either case, these actions show attempts by conservative elites to 
defy -- and outright contradict -- the Court’s interpretation.  
 Specifically important to note, related to the attempted constitutional amendment 
proposals, is the alignment of state and federal representatives. Within two months of the 
decision, conservatives at the state level passed resolutions calling for Congressional 
action on the issue. Just days after those state legislature resolutions, Congressional 
Republicans supplied the very constitutional amendments discussed by the state 
legislatures. 
 Although conservative action mostly focused on the passing of constitutional 
amendments, conservatives did not end their response with those attempts. Several state 
legislatures produced new legislation restricting abortion within the bounds of the Court’s 
decision, and in a couple of cases, increase the state’s ability to restrict the procedure, 
irrespective of the legislative framework outlined by the Court’s decision. Throughout the 
period, and similarly important to this analysis, conservatives voiced their disagreement 
and admonishment of the decision. 
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 All in all, conservatives reacted strongly and unified in their opposition to Roe. 
Congressional Republicans attempted the amend the constitution, state-level Republicans 
attempted to increase restrictions on abortions, and many Republicans -- at both levels -- 
levied harsh criticisms at the Court.  
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
 Texas law in 2003 prohibited intimate sexual behavior between persons of the 
same sex. While responding to a call concerning a different reported crime, Houston 
police entered the apartment of John Lawrence. Mr. Lawrence was having sex with a 
sexual partner of the same sex, Tyron Garner. Houston police arrested both men, as their 
private behavior violated Texas law.63 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 6-justice 
majority, found that the Texas law violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 
The Texas law intruded onto what the court saw as private and personal behavior, absent 
a legitimate state interest in intruding.  
 While the Court’s decision dealt only with a law prohibiting sexual intimacy 
between same-sex couples, opponents of the decision felt that the ruling gave way to 
much wider social changes. In a long dissent, Justice Scalia, for example, argued that the 
Court’s ruling would inevitably pave the way to the legalization of gay marriage 
nationwide.64 
 The Lawrence decision exists in a period of time where political activity 
concerning gay rights was very high. Moreover, the Court’s decision in Lawrence -- 
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announced in late June 2003 -- comes 5 months before the Mass. decision in Goodridge, 
the focus of Ball’s important literature. As such, the three-month timeline of our analysis 
isolates the political activity of conservatives just after the Lawrence decision and well-
before the Goodridge decision. In this way, we can be sure that the political activity of 
conservatives during this time is actually attributable to the Lawrence decision, excluding 
confounding political events. 
 Before proceeding with the analysis of conservative political elite reaction to this 
decision I establish two critical factors allowing for that analysis to carry on. First, I 
establish the Texas law as a conservative policy interest. Second, I spend time framing 
the worries espoused by Justice Scalia - and a number of other conservatives - facing this 
decision, talking specifically about how conservatives perceived this decision to threaten 
their wider policy interests. 
Lawrence as a Conservative Policy Interest 
 In order to analyze this decision within the framework discussed, it must be 
established that this decision indeed struck down a law supported by conservative policy 
interests, thus priming a conservative political elite reaction in response. 
 Critically, in 2003, neither major political party endorsed support for same-sex 
marriage nationwide. However, in the years leading up to the decision, incrementally the 
Democratic Party supported protections for same-sex couples. Conversely, the 
Republican Party opposed protections for same-sex couples. In 1996, two Republicans 
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sponsored and introduced the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage for 
federal purposes as the union of one man and one woman, for example.65  
 By 2003, polarization on the issue became clearer, where conservatives more 
strongly stood resolute against the recognition of same-sex unions, and Democrats 
became more open. The opposition to this decision was led by conservatives, where its 
support came from liberals. We can thus determine that the Lawrence decision struck 
down conservative policy interests. 
Framing the Policy Interest Harmed 
 This section intends to define the exact conservative policy interest harmed. The 
Lawrence decision struck down a Texas law governing the private sexual behavior of 
consenting adults. In normal circumstances, within the framework of this study, we 
would assume that the policy interest harmed is the same as the policy actually struck 
down. Which is to say, we may assume that the conservative policy interest here is the 
ability to govern private sexual behavior. In this case, the connection between the Court’s 
decision and the policy interest harmed is less direct and more nuanced. 
 As mentioned previously, conservatives read the Court’s decision here as 
providing a path to the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage. Following 
Lawrence, conservative political elites became concerned with the preservation of their 
definition of marriage, not their ability to govern an individual's sexual activity. For 
conservatives, changing social and moral definitions of marriage via judicial decision was 
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the true threat. In line with that thinking, their reaction to the Lawrence decision is aimed 
at attacking the potential threat. 
The Lawrence Reaction 
 The reaction to the Lawrence decision from conservative legislatures was strong 
and nearly immediate. Before a month passed following the decision, 76 members of the 
US House of Representatives sponsored a constitutional amendment, known as the 
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), saying that marriages in the United States shall 
consist only of the union of a man and a woman.66 House Republican, Marilyn 
Musgrave, introduced the FMA. In this first month, despite the support of 76 co-
sponsors, Republican establishment figures had not yet attached themselves to the idea. 
 On July 30th, during a press conference, President George Bush supplied the first 
bit of strong establishment support towards the idea. First, President Bush agreed that the 
Court’s decision changed social landscapes and political conversations, saying, “And 
that's really where the issue is headed here in Washington, and that is the definition of 
marriage.” Later in the press conference, President Bush offered his definition of 
marriage, the union of a man and a woman, and then argued that“ we ought to codify that 
one way or the other. And we've got lawyers looking at the best way to do that,”.67 
 President Bush’s statements, although not an explicit endorsement of the proposed 
amendment, lit a new fire under its support. Two days after the press conference, the 
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Republican Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, via a spokeswoman, explained that he “is 
opposed to same-sex marriages, gay adoptions, and the extension of domestic Partners 
benefits,”.68 By July 31st, support for the FMA grew to 86 members of the House of 
Representatives.69 Similarly, in late July, the Senate's Republican policy committee 
issued a 12-page paper called the “Threat to Marriage”, concluding that the only way to 
ensure marriage remains between men and women was a constitutional amendment.70 
 In August, the momentum continued to grow, finding a stronghold of support in 
the U.S Senate. Just before the August recess, Senator John Cornyn, R-Texas, called for 
Senate hearings, immediately following the recess, in an effort from Congress to 
“safeguard the institution of marriage”.71 Support for the Federal Marriage Amendment 
also continued to grow amongst the nation’s highest ranking Republican officials. Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tennessee, expressed his support for the amendment.72  
 Conservative elite support only continued to grow into the month of September. 
On September 4th, the U.S Senate held hearing exploring ways to block a potential 
overturning of the Defense of Marriage Act.73 On September 17th, three prominent 
Republican Senators spoke in a press conference discussing support for the FMA.74 
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Among them, the third highest ranking Republican Senator, Rick Santorum, along with 
Senator Jeff Sessions and Senator Sam Brownback. 
Analyzing the Lawrence Reaction 
 Conservative reaction following the Lawrence decision was strong and decisive. 
In short order, prominent, establishment Republicans voiced their support for ways to 
attack the perceived threat posed by the Lawrence decision. Within three months, and 
critically before any court actually ruled in favor of recognizing same-sex couples, 
Republicans organized a proposed federal constitutional amendment, sponsored by over 
80 members of the House of Representatives, endorsed by the Republican majority leader 
and third-ranking member in the Senate, and supported in principle by the President of 
the United States. 
 The infrastructure surrounding this proposed amendment is similarly large by 
scale. Again, within these three months, Republicans in the Senate organized hearings, 
identifying those ways that Congress could best protect their definition of marriage. 
What’s more, the Senate Republican Policy Committee produced a report identifying this 
proposed amendment as the best way to protect their definition of marriage. 
 Conservatives, at the federal level, generally operated swiftly and in unison, 
producing strong and powerful substantive actions aimed at protecting their policy 
interests. While there were congressional Republicans operating outside of this interest -- 
meaning those that disagreed with the need for a federal amendment, for example -- the 
unison from those most prominent establishment figures is of particular note for the 
purpose of this study. 
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Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
 In 2000, a Colorado statute provided a buffer-zone for individuals entering the 
buildings of certain health care providers. Specifically, the law prohibited political 
demonstrators from approaching any individual, without that person’s consent, in order to 
pass them leaflets, display signs, offer advice, or engage in other types of “sidewalk 
counseling” within 100 feet of a healthcare facility.75 Many anti-abortion protesters in the 
state utilized sidewalk counseling to offer abortion alternatives to woman entering 
abortion clinics. One protester claimed that the state’s “buffer law” violated her First 
Amendment rights. 
 Writing for the 6-justice majority, Justice Stevens ruled that the Colorado statute 
did not invade an individual’s right to free speech. Justice Stevens argued that the law did 
not restrict speech; rather, the law regulated those areas where speech could occur. The 
law does not restrict the content of the messages delivered by individuals, and only 
protects the right of the unwilling listener to not receive unwanted communications.76 
 In the next sections, I establish the Colorado law as a liberal policy interest, and 
then summarize the reactions of liberal political elites in the three months following the 
Court’s decision. Afterward, I analyze the reaction of liberal political elites. 
Hill as a Liberal Policy Interest 
 In this section, I briefly establish the Colorado statute as a liberal policy interest. 
The Colorado statute was enacted in 1993, sponsored by Democrat state-Rep. Rep Diana 
                                                 




DeGette and signed into law by a Democrat governor.77 The law appears similar to other 
laws across the country also signed into law by Democrats. Similarly, given the two 
parties stances on the abortion issue, the law follows the Democratic Party’s interest in 
protecting abortion rights and access. 
The Hill Reaction 
 Following the Court’s decision, only one Democrat issued a statement praising the 
Court’s decision in Hill. U.S Representative Degette, the same Rep. Degette who 
authored the law upheld by the Court, the decision a victory for patients ’rights. Rep. 
DeGette similarly expressed her hope that the Colorado law would go on to serve as a 
model for other states to follow.78  
 Just as only one Democratic Representative issued a statement supporting the 
decision, only one state legislature created legislation capitalizing on the Court’s decision 
within the three months following the Court’s decision. In late July, Democrats in the 
Massachusetts state legislature produced a law creating an 18-foot buffer zone for clinics 
within the state.79  
Analyzing the Hill Reaction 
 Liberals seemingly ignored the policy victory they experienced via the Court’s 
decision in Hill. Only one Democratic Representative spoke on the Court’s decision, and 
it was the same Representative who authored the law. No prominent or establishment 
party figure hailed the decision as a protection of women’s access to abortion while 
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respecting an individual’s right to protest. At the time of the Court’s decision, Al Gore 
stood as the Democratic Party’s preeminent nominee for President in the 2000 election. 
The candidate did not invoke the court’s ruling throughout his primary or general election 
campaign.  
 Similarly, representatives at the federal level chose not to introduce legislation 
modeling the Colorado law. In the 106th Congress, Democrats held sizable minorities in 
both houses of Congress. As of the date of the Court’s decision, Democrats held 45 seats 
in the Senate, and 210 seats in the House of Representatives.80 None of the Congressional 
Democrats introduced legislation regarding the law upheld by the Court in Hill. 
 At the state level, one legislative body followed Colorado’s model, as Rep. 
DeGette hoped. The Massachusetts legislature successfully passed a law modeled after 
the Colorado statute. Democratic efforts to model the law ended with the Massachusetts 
law. As of the date of the court’s decision, Democrats controlled 20 state legislatures, 
while an additional 14 state legislatures split control of the statehouse.81 Even still, only 
one legislature introduced new legislation based on the policy victory made in the court, 
despite only 14 states having laws similar to Colorado’s at the time of the decision.82  
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 
 The concept of “affirmative action” began during the civil rights era, and was seen 
as a mechanism by which to address the ramifications of our country’s long-history of 
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racial discrimination. Institutions of higher learning (colleges, universities, and graduate 
schools) often use affirmative action policies in order to increase minority representation 
in institutions where minorities were typically excluded. These policies began during 
President Kennedy’s administration and were first enforced by President Johnson’s 
administration.83 The University of Michigan School of Law was one institution which 
relied on affirmative action during its admissions process.84  
 The Law School explicitly used race as a factor in admissions decisions, in the 
pursuit of increasing the diversity of their student body. In 1997, a white applicant 
applied to the Law School with strong academic credentials. She was denied admission to 
the school, while minority applicants with lower academic credentials were accepted.85 
Given that the Law School was operated by the state, the applicant claimed that its 
reliance on racial preference violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Writing for the 5-justice majority, Justice O’Connor concluded that the Law 
School’s use of racial preference, pursuing the legitimate interest of a diverse student 
body, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Law School ensured that the 
admissions committee did not automatically base decisions on race, and instead, 
conducted highly individualized reviews of each applicant, where a number of the 
applicant’s factors were considered.86  
                                                 





 In the following sections, I establish affirmative action as a liberal policy interest, 
and then discuss how liberal political elites responded to their victory in the court in the 
three months following the Court’s announcement. 
Grutter as a Liberal Policy Interest 
 In this section, I briefly establish affirmative action as a liberal policy interest. As 
mentioned previously, the first mention of affirmative action, within the context of the 
federal government, occurred during the Kennedy administration, as a continuation of 
civil rights era legislation. In 1965, President Johnson offered the first “definition” of 
affirmative action from the federal government, defining it as a mechanism by which to 
ensure equality of opportunity and result for historically disadvantaged racial groups.87  
 In the years following, numbers of liberal political elites continued to champion 
affirmative action in employment and education admission, seeking to further progress 
towards equality of opportunity. As such, we can be sure that affirmative action 
represents a liberal policy interest. 
The Grutter Reaction 
 Liberal reaction to their victory in Grutter was short and brief. To be sure, 
affirmative action was a highly contested political issue. Through 1978 to 1997, 7 
Supreme Court cases dealt with the issue of affirmative action. A number of those 
decisions dealt explicitly with affirmative action policies in university admissions. 
Republican President Bush expressed his fear that affirmative action resulted in the use of 
                                                 




racial quotas. The Bush administration specifically urged the Supreme Court to strike 
down the school’s admissions policy.88 
 Even still, only 3 Democratic figures issued statements following the Court’s 
decision. Senator Edward M. Kennedy claimed the decision as a victory, saying “[a]ll of 
us here know the vast importance of affirmative action and its essential role in achieving 
genuinely equal opportunity for all in our society”, during a conference of civil rights 
lawyers.89 Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle called the decision, “ a clear victory for 
all Americans”.90 Senator John Edwards, an eventual 2004 Democratic Presidential 
Primary candidate, explained that “[t]he court reaffirmed the compelling interest in racial 
and ethnic diversity in higher education”.91  
Analyzing the Grutter Reaction 
 I begin this analysis with a discussion of what liberals actually achieved during 
the period after the Court’s decision. Prominent and established figures within the Party 
did offer statements championing the Court’s ruling. These statements came from the 
Senate minority leader, the famous and long-serving Senator Ted Kennedy, and a Senator 
who would go on to finish second in the 2004 Presidential Primary.  
 That being said, the response of liberals following the Court’s decision remains 
underwhelming, when considering all the policy options available to capitalize on the 
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victory in the court. Specifically, despite the sentiment expressed by the party’s leading 
figures, not a single piece of legislation was introduced at either the state or federal level. 
In 2003, the 108th Congress was composed of 49 members of the Democratic caucus, 
and 206 members of the House of Representatives, accounting for 48 percent in both 
chambers92. In the three months following the decision, these Democrats did not 
introduce any legislation protecting, expanding, or even mentioning the use of race in 
admissions processes with regard to federal law. 
 Of similar importance to note is the lack of legislative action at the state level. At 
the time of the court’s decision, several states held laws outlawing the use of “preferential 
treatment on the basis of race” by state universities. California’s Proposition 209 stands as 
an example.93  In 2003, Democrats held majorities in both chambers of California’s 
legislature.94 Those majorities did not act to remove Proposition 209. In fact, the 
legislature would take action to remove Proposition 209 until 2014.95  
 One may argue that the lack of action is a result of the Court’s ruling “ending” the 
policy fight. However, opponents of affirmative action continued rallying against it. By 
2006, for example, voters approved a law similar to California’s in Michigan, the same 
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state whose public universities use of race in admissions was deemed constitutional by 
the court in Grutter.96 Which is to say, the policy fight was far from over, but Democrats 
at the state and federal level, remained inactive in the three months following the Court’s 
decision. 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) 
 Throughout the 1990s, Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provided tuition 
aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District, 
allowing them to attend the public or private schools of their parent's choosing. In 1999, 
nearly 82 percent of participating schools had religious affiliations, and over 95 percent 
of vouchers were used at religiously affiliated schools.97 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
the Court considered whether or not the use of public funds towards tuition at schools 
with religious affiliations violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.  
 Writing for the 5-justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that the voucher 
program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Ohio’s program allowed for parents to 
choose any school participating. Religious institutions only received government aid 
following the deliberate choice of the individual families. Any incidental endorsement of 
a particular institution could be attributed to the family and not the government98.  
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 In the following sections, I outline the reaction of conservative political elites 
following the Zelman ruling. Before proceeding with an analysis of that reaction, I 
established that school voucher programs are a conservative policy interest.  
Zelman as a Conservative Policy Interest 
 In this section, I establish school vouchers as a conservative policy interest. To 
begin with, the idea of “school choice” was highly lauded by conservatives, beginning 
with President Ronald Reagan.99 Continuing with that policy pursuit, during the 2000 
Presidential Election, then-candidate George Bush called for a federally funded, national 
voucher system.100  
 In 2002, President Bush signed into law the “No Child Left Behind Act”, 
extending numerous school choices to parents across the country.101 While this policy did 
not create any voucher system, conservatives believed the establishment of charter and 
magnet schools would further the push for one. We can be certain here that school 
voucher systems are a conservative policy interest. 
The Zelman Reaction 
 Following the Court’s decision, a number of prominent and establishment 
conservative political elites voiced their agreement. On the day of the decision, President 
Bush praised the Court and called their ruling a “landmark decision”. Specifically, 
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President Bush opined that the ruling was a, “victory for parents and children throughout 
America. By holding the constitutionality of the Cleveland school choice program, the 
Supreme Court has offered the hope of an excellent education to parents and children 
throughout the country,”.102  
 On the same day, Senator George Voinovich and Rep. John Boehner both offered 
similar statements praising the Court’s ruling. Senator Voinovich viewed the decision as 
positive, now that, “states and school districts will have available another tool in their 
efforts to improve education,”103. Rep. Boehner called the decision a “victory not only for 
low-income parents and students, but for American education as well,”.104  
Analyzing the Zelman Reaction 
 Conservative reaction to the Court’s decision in Zelman began strongly. President 
Bush, perhaps the most well-known and prominent Republican figure at the time praised 
the Court ’s decision. Two Republican Congressmen provided similar praise. Their 
comments did more than just support the Court’s ruling, however. The comments voiced 
support for expanding school voucher programs across America. President Bush believed 
the Court’s ruling provided the hope of a better education to parents “across the country”. 
The comments from two Congressman included the thinking that the Court’s ruling could 
provide benefits nationwide. Which is to say, not only did conservative political elites 
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voice their praise, they provided hope of expanding and capitalizing on the policy interest 
upheld by the Court. 
 While these comments reflect a desire on the part of conservative political elites 
to expand use of school voucher programs, in the three months following the Court’s 
decision, no policies were introduced at either the state or federal level. At the time of the 
Court’s decision in Zelman, only two other states, Wisconsin and Florida, had enacted 
voucher programs.105 In 2002, Republicans controlled 21 state houses and held majorities 
in both houses of Congress.106 Nonetheless, Republicans did not introduce legislation 
expanding the usage of school voucher programs was introduced in the three months 
following the Court’s ruling.  
 One may argue that the lack of action at the state level stems from state laws 
prohibiting voucher programs similar to the one used in Ohio. Indeed, over State 
Constitutions featured amendments barring the passage of money from the state treasury 
towards religious institutions.107 These amendments represented a barrier in 
conservatives hopes of expanding school voucher programs. It remains the case, 
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however, that following the Court’s ruling that voucher programs did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, no Republicans attempted the removal of these laws. 
Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014) 
 Since 1999, the Town of Greene in New York state has begun each of its monthly 
town meetings with a prayer, delivered by an invited member of the local clergy.  
Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of these prayers and were the 
recipients of a vast majority of the town’s invitations.108 Two citizens of the town sued, 
claiming that the town government’s practices violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment, by showing preference for Christian prayer.  
 Writing for the 5-justice majority, Chief Justice Kennedy ruled that the town’s 
prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the First 
Amendment was never intended to prohibit legislative prayer.109 Moreover, the Court 
could not require those prayers be non-sectarian, as that would force the Court into a 
position where they become arbiters of religious speech. Importantly and critically, the 
Court limited their ruling only to situations of legislative prayer.  
 In the forthcoming sections, I analyze this decision within the framework of this 
study. As such, I begin by establishing that the decision concerned a conservative policy 
interest. Afterward, I outline the response and actions of conservative political elites in 
the three month’s following the Court’s announcement.  
Town of Greece as a Conservative Policy Interest 
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 The protection of religious practice, in and out of the public square, is amongst 
the most recognizable features of the American conservative movement. By this alone, it 
would follow that the protection of religious practice in this context is similarly situated. 
That being said, conservative political elites have practiced legislative prayer in the past. 
The 1983 Supreme Court decision in Marsh v. Chambers concerned the conservative 
majority in the Nebraska legislature’s decision to pay a Presbyterian minister for prayer 
opening their legislative sessions.110 As such, we can be sure that this decision impacts a 
conservative policy interest.  
The Town of Greece Reaction 
 Conservative political elite reaction to the Court's decision in The Town of 
Greece was very small. At the federal and state level, the database and supplemental 
searches did not reveal any comments from representatives on the court’s decision. 
Similarly, no legislative bodies made changes to their own practices to either hold or 
withhold legislative prayer before their assemblies. 
Analyzing the Town of Greece Reaction 
 Following the Court’s decisions, I found no evidence of action taken by 
conservative political figures. I similarly found no statements of praise from conservative 
figures. One may argue that this inaction results from a lack of areas to expand the policy 
interest. Which is to say, perhaps it is the case that conservative political figures appear to 
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have done nothing, because their legislative body already practices legislative prayer. 
Indeed, 48 states open each session with a prayer.111 
 That being said, there were no attempts by conservative political elites to expand 
the use of prayer before other governmental events. However, in the New Jersey city of 
Carteret, a Democrat mayor attempted to do just that. The same week the Court 
announced its decision in The Town of Greece, Mayor Dan Reiman cancelled a 
Citizenship Ceremony hosted by the U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services Agency 
because of their policy barring religious statements from naturalization services.112  The 
mayor wanted the ceremony to include a prayer and moment of silence. After the event 
was cancelled, the mayor explained that, “Carteret is not a godless community. 
Immigration Services can therefore host its godless ceremony someplace else,”.113 This 
example highlights a way in which some political elite could have attempted to expand 
the practice of prayer before government events. Critically, conservative political figures 
chose not to. 
Conservative Reaction When Conservative Policy Interest is Harmed 
 Following the two decisions studied where conservative policy interests were 
harmed, conservative political elites reacted swiftly, strongly, and unified. Within 3 
months, conservatives employed constitutional amendment proposals, legislative 
proposals, and strong statements condemning the court’s ruling. Conservatives at the state 
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and federal level employed these strategies, and appeared to work in coordination with 
each other. I discuss the presence of the three aforementioned strategies more specifically 
in turn. 
 To begin, the conservative political establishment in both cases produced strong 
statements either condemning the court’s decision or advocating for the responsive 
political strategies employed. Following Lawrence, this cohesion featured President 
Bush, several high-ranking Republican Senators, and the Senate’s Republican Policy 
Committee. Following Roe, conservative voices included several entire state legislatures, 
and numerous Congressional Republicans. In both instances, the vocal response was 
strong in stature, unified in opposition, and large. 
 Secondly, conservative political elites at the state and federal level introduced 
legislation, again at the state and federal level, defying the Court’s ruling. More 
specifically, the legislation introduced by conservatives either attempted to mitigate the 
policy losses brought upon by the Court’s decision, or altogether ignored the Court’s 
ruling. The conservative reaction following Roe featured this strategy. In two state 
legislatures, conservatives introduced legislation increasing the state’s ability to restrict 
abortion. Numerous other legislatures amended their existing abortion laws, maximizing 
their restriction capabilities within the bounds of the Court’s decision.  
 Third, conservative political elites relied heavily on the introduction of 
constitutional amendments. In both of the cases studied, conservatives attempted the 
passage of constitutional amendments effectively eliminating the Court’s decision. 
Following Lawrence, Republicans proposed a federal constitutional amendment, defining 
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marriage as the union between one man and one woman. Over 80 Republican House 
members co-sponsored the amendment, the Republican majority leader in the house and 
the third-ranking Republican Senator endorsed the Amendment, and the President 
supported the proposed definition of marriage, along with federal action to codify it. 
Following Roe, conservatives 5 state legislatures either passed resolutions calling on 
Congress to create a federal constitutional amendment banning abortion or introduced a 
state constitutional amendment doing the same. 
 The cumulative impact of these two conservative reactions highlights the 
advantages of this study’s design. One could argue, after reading the section covering the 
Roe decision, that this paper only contributes analysis of a very large reaction to that 
decision, without identifying any potential patterns in behavior amongst conservatives or 
liberals. The inclusion of two cases in each category provides cumulative evidence 
countering that potential argument. It shows that the reaction to Roe is not an outlier, as a 
similar reaction was exhibited following Lawrence. Further, when juxtaposed against the 
reactions from liberals following the cases studied, we can begin to see a pattern of 
asymmetry emerging.  
Liberal Reaction When Liberal Policy Interest is Harmed 
 Liberal political elite reaction following the two decisions studied where liberal 
policy interests were harmed is more difficult to generalize. In one instance, liberals 
responded disjointed. In the other, liberals responded strongly at first, but conceded 
defeat soon after. In the following section, I discuss which how liberals employed the 
strategies discussed in the literature. 
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 First, I consider whether liberals offered statements condemning the Court’s 
decision. The use of such statements was not widespread across the two cases studied. 
Following Heller, some liberal political elites admonished the Court for use of “rigid 
ideology”, and voiced concern for their constituents ’safety. At the same time, a number 
of high-standing liberal political elites voiced approval of or agreement with the Court’s 
decision. The liberal political elites voicing agreement with the decision included the 
Democratic Party’s preeminent nominee for President, member of Congress, and the 
Governor of Ohio. Following Burwell, Democrats appeared more unified in their 
opposition to the Court’s riling. Voices opposing the decision included the President and 
several members of Congress. In sum, liberal political were sometimes unified in voicing 
disagreement with decisions harming their interests, and sometimes splintered on their 
interpretation of the Court’s decision.   
 Next, I consider the legislative proposals brought by liberal political elites 
following the Court’s decision. Here again, the cases studied revealed mixed results. 
Following Heller, political action taken by liberal political elites was almost non-existent. 
Democrats in Congress produced zero legislative proposals concerning the regulations of 
firearms. At the state level, Democrats were similarly inactive, as only one legislature 
introduced a law regulating gun ownership. Moreover, that law, introduced by the North 
Carolina General Assembly, did not attempt to contradict the Court’s ruling. Following 
Burwell, Democrats appeared more active for some period of time. Within the first month 
following the decision, Congressional Democrats introduced two laws either directly 
contradicting the Court’s decision or mitigating the policy losses brought upon by the 
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Court’s decision. In sum, here again, in some cases liberal political elites produced 
legislation attacking the Court’s decision, and sometimes failed to produce any 
meaningful proposals. 
 Third, liberal political elite reliance on constitutional amendments was uneven. 
Following Heller, Democrats, at the state and federal level, did not introduce any 
constitutional amendments concerning gun ownership or regulation. Following Burwell, 
Congressional Democrats did produce a Constitutional amendment, indirectly impacting 
the Court’s decision. Here again, in some instance liberal political elites proposed 
constitutional amendments which they believed would undo the Court’s decision, while in 
others no such action was pursued.  
 While these three strategies account for the majority of the expected reaction, the 
study of liberal reaction revealed one other reaction critical to this discussion. Just two 
months after the Burwell decision, the Obama administration announced that it would 
allow for-profit companies the exception required the Court’s decision, and that the 
contraception coverage at issue would be provided for via payment by the Federal 
government. In every other instance, and from the guidance provided by the literature, 
political actors whose interests are harmed by a Court’s decision act to oppose decision. 
Here, the Obama administration conceded. Their action did not oppose the court’s 
decision, it did not look to undermine or eliminate it. Rather, the administration embraced 
the Court’s decision, and followed its explicit guidance. 
 Clearly, Democrats responded very differently in these two cases. The 
contribution provided by this section is more nuanced than the previous section. Keeping 
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in mind the literature’s expectation that Court decisions “radicalize” the political 
opposition, this section’s contribution becomes clearer. While acknowledging the 
differences in the two reactions, and recognizing that only two cases within this category 
were analyzed, we can comfortably say that in these cases, liberal reaction did not reach 
the level of an “out of hand rejection” of political compromise. In both instances, we saw 
political reactions completely unseen by the reactions of conservatives. Specifically, we 
saw liberal political elites make concessions. After Heller, some liberal elites praised the 
Court. After Burwell, the Obama administration ended the party’s opposition to the 
decision, by designing a policy explicitly congruent with it. In this way, these two cases 
suggest that liberal political elite reaction, generally speaking, lacked the radical element 
anticipated by the literature. 
Conservative Reaction When Conservative Policy Interest is Upheld 
 In those instances where the Court upheld a conservative policy interest, there is 
little evidence suggesting an attempt to capitalize on the policy victory. In the two cases 
analyzed, there was some evidence suggesting conservative political elites praised the 
Court’s decision, and voiced hope that the policies use would expand. After Zelman, for 
example, President Bush, along with a few members of Congress praised the Court’s 
decision. That being said, in neither case was the policy actually expand. In the two 
cases, there was no relevant policy introduced by conservatives at the state or federal 
level.  
Liberal Reaction When Liberal Policy Interest is Upheld 
 56 
 In those instances where the Court upheld a liberal policy interest, there is 
similarly little evidence suggesting an attempt to capitalize on the policy victory. In two 
cases analyzed, there is evidence that liberal political elites praise the victory in the 
media. Following Grutter, several high-ranking Democratic members of Congress 
praised the Court’s ruling. Similarly, following Hill, one Democrat member of Congress 
praised the decision, and expressed hope that the policy would be expanded into other 
state’s laws. For liberal elite reaction in these circumstances, there was also some 
evidence suggesting an attempt to expand the policy victory, After Hill, one state 
legislature passed into law a statute similar to the one upheld in the Court’s decision. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 The finding from this research provides two important contributions to the study 
of political elite behavior following Supreme Court decisions impacting policy interests. 
While this study provides a more holistic and wide ranging analysis of elite behavior in 
these circumstances, it is nonetheless restricted by the number of cases relied upon. 
Specifically, the findings are limited to the two cases analyzed within each category. 
These contributions should serve as preliminary evidence upon which future studies 
should be informed and motivated. 
 With those limitations clearly laid out, this paper contributes evidence suggesting 
that an asymmetry exists between the reactions of conservatives and liberals when 
Supreme Court decisions harm their respective policy interests. Namely, liberal political 
elite response lacks the “radical” element present in conservative political elite response. 
The research collected from two cases tracing conservative behavior and the two cases 
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tracing liberal behavior, in circumstances where the Court strikes down their policy 
interest, advances that notion.  
 Klarman found that the Court’s decision in Brown radicalized Southern politics. 
The radical element of the conservative response to Brown was a key element of 
Klarman’s findings. Radical, in this sense, means that political elite response is so 
absolute in opposition against the Court’s decision that compromise is not an option. 
Elites do not look for middle ground, nor do they look for small policy victories. The 
strategies they employ while responding to the Court’s decision seek to eliminate the 
decision from the policy landscape.  
 The findings from this study suggest that conservative political elite response to 
other Supreme Court decisions harming their political interests contain this radical 
element. In cases surrounding “politically charged” policy issues, when the Court harms 
conservative policy interests, conservative political elite response is uniformly radical 
and uncompromising.  
 On the other hand, the findings from this study suggests that liberal political elite 
response lacks the radical element present in conservative political elite response. Based 
on the two cases studied here, liberal response is either disjointed or quick to concede. 
Either scenario demonstrates a clear lack of a “radical” response. The lack of a radical 
response from liberal political elites would suggest an asymmetry in the way political 
elites respond to Supreme Court decisions that harm their party’s policy interests. 
 At the same time, this study provides valuable insights into how political elites 
react when the Supreme Court upholds their policy interests. Specifically, the research 
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suggests that neither party responds to these decisions by trying to capitalize on the 
policy victory. Where one might assume that political elites respond to victories in the 
Court by expanding the use of a policy, the evidence presented here suggests that 
political elites fail to capitalize on those policy victories. There was very little evidence 
of policy victories in the court being used “as a model” for other states to follow, despite 
explicit calls from political elites. If we consider this finding in conjunction with our 
previous contributions, this means that when the Court strikes a party’s policy interest, 
elites respond with political actions, differing in magnitude. When the court uphold s 
party’s policy interest, elites respond with political inaction.  
Overall, this paper furthers our understanding of political elite behavior and the 
interactions between our systems of government. It provides a holistic view of how 
political elites interact with Supreme Court decisions. Specifically, these findings give us 
valuable insights into how and when Supreme Court decisions impact the political 
landscape, with an eye towards differences between elites of different political allegiance 
and the nature of the Court’s decision. Consideration of liberal elite response, and elite 
response following instances where the Court upholds a party’s policy interest is a novel 
one in this field.  
In closing, I would like to reiterate that this paper intended on broadening our 
conception of elite behavior and the impacts of Supreme Court decisions. The findings 
produced by this paper would be greatly advanced by further studies, continuing the 
consideration of partisan differences in reaction strategies and how victories in the Court 
impact political behavior. 
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